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Mental Barriers to Learning and Creativity in
Transportation Planning
Jonathan Richmond
Planners and politicians tend to render the complex in black-and-white. Technological metaphors play an important
role in this process of self-delusion which results in impoverished planning. Analysts rely too much on quantitative
techniques because they provide an illusion of science and certainty. Politicians are too easily swayed by the vivid
imagery of technological solutions, ignoring the difficult, abstract questions of social values and goals which should
be addressed before any technology is chosen. These themes are explored with the aid of a case study of transportation
planning in Southern California.
Two things fill the mind with ever-increasing
wonder and awe the more often and the more
intensely the mind is drawn to them: the starry
heavens above me and the moral law within
me.
— Immanuel Kant
Critique of Practical Reason
When Copernicus argued in 1543, that the earth rotates
daily on its own axis and moves annually around a sta-
tionary sun, he was attacked by a Lutheran follower, Mel-
achthan, since "the eyes are witnesses that the heavens
revolve in the space of twenty-four hours" (Kuhn, 1957).
Because we all see the world through the eyes of our own
experience and values, each theory carries its own set of
assumptions which gives it meaning. Only through aware-
ness of the shortcomings besetting the way we receive and
deal with information do we stand a chance of finding
a more ready path to understanding.
But not only are we unaware; we do not seek to be more
aware. We suffer, says Boulding (1968), from agora-
phobia, "the fear of open spaces, especially open spaces
in the mind." We identify with and are reassured by rec-
ognizable forms: we try to blot out the void and disorder
of the unknown over which we have no control. Though
one can only be wise, warned Harold Laski in 1930, "if
he admits that his knowledge of the subject is mainly a
measure of his ignorance of its boundaries," we delude
ourselves into believing that we have successfully closed
in on the essence of the subject under study in an ef-
fort to escape from the reality and consequences of our
ignorance.
Thus, says Ackoff (1981), "we usually try to reduce
complex situations to what appear to be one or more sim-
ple solvable problems. This is sometimes referred to as
'cutting the problem down to size.' In so doing we often
reduce our chances of finding a creative solution to the
original problem."
Pacey (1983) illustrates just this phenomenon by relating
the problems associated with simple hand pumps used at
village wells in India. While about 150,000 new pumps
had been installed by 1975, as many as two-thirds of them
were simultaneously out of order.
Engineers identified faults and corrected defects, but
pumps continued to break down. "What at first held up
solution of the problem," writes Pacey, "was a view of
technology which began and ended with the machine . . .
People in many walks of life tend to focus on the tangible,
technical aspects of any practical problem, and then to
think that the extraordinary capabilities of modern tech-
nology ought to lead to an appropriate 'fix.'"
Progress required the realization that this was more
than just an engineering problem. A "breakthrough only
came when all aspects of the administration, maintenance
and technical design of the pump were thought of in rela-
tion to one another. . .Arrangements for servicing the
pumps were not very effective. There was another diffi-
culty, too, because in many villages, nobody felt any per-
sonal responsibility for looking after the pumps. . ."
Without an adequate administrative system to keep the
pumps in good working order, repairing a pump could
provide no more than a short-term solution: without
proper maintenance — something local people could pro-
vide if shown how — it would soon be out of order once
more. "It was only when these things were tackled together
that pump performance began to improve."
Schon (1983) emphasizes the need for "problem setting
... a process in which, interactively, we name the things
to which we will attend and frame the context in which
we will attend to them," but finds that "from the perspec-
tive of Technical Rationality, professional practice is a
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process of problem solving." Our uncritical tendency to
take problems as "given" and our failure to probe the alter-
native contexts in which they may be set, may not only
lead us unsuspectingly down the wrong path, but also
keep more productive avenues beyond sight. Thus, while
the defective village pumps were automatically seen as
a technological problem to be "solved," without inquiry
into the context in which the defects existed, the key to
curing the problem — which lay outside the technological
domain — remained inaccessible.
"Our technology— the subject of our predictions"— says
Schon (1967), "also helps to determine the theories under
which we make predictions, since it provides the meta-
phors out of which our theories are made." This article
will show how technological metaphors can tacitly frame
the context in which professional analytic work and polit-
ical decision-making are conducted, masking from view
the more basic issues upon which both should depend.
Two different metaphors implicit in processes of anal-
ysis and decision-making will be made explicit. On the
one hand, the tendency for the analyst to formulate and
tackle a problem through the lens of the technique he
uses — rather than reflect on the nature and context of the
problem at hand before choosing any techniques — will
be shown to give quantitative methods both a distorting
and controlling power over his view of the world and the
conclusions he reaches. A theory of action will be pre-
sented which is rooted in a desire for closure, for the mind
to select simple but inadequate concepts to deal with con-
ditions of complexity. Quantitative models are desired,
it will be argued, because "it is comforting to imagine that
someone in this topsy-turvy world has an answer" (Win-
ner, 1975). Such models provide a determinate answer
with the scientific appearance of authority, but they can
distract us from exposing the fundamental problems we
face.
On the other hand, the inclination for politicians to
view questions of technology choice from the perspective
of a superficially attractive technology, rather than from
a discussion of social values and goals, will be shown to
result not in the choice of a particular technology for its
abilities to resolve a particular problem, but in the deter-
mination of both goals and solutions according to the
symbolic appeal of particular technologies. While analysts
find security in the apparent certainty of answers derived
from quantitative techniques, politicians, it will be argued,
draw on the comforting solidity of the physical and the
obvious, focusing technology choice on a machinery
brought into view not so often by our particularly human
conceptual abilities as by our equally human emotions
and fears. Technologies are thereby selected because of
their intuitive appeal as cure-all solutions.
In a Southern California which demanded increasing
mobility by car, it seemed only natural to build massive
freeway systems. With hindsight we now question the wis-
dom of such narrow-sighted programs, but fall into a
similar trap by assuming that all ills can be cured by
building a network of railways. By failing to test our
intuitions, we ignore the central value questions which
might help us decide if the technology should have a place
in our society, and are deflected from paths to potentially
more creative solutions.
This article will start with several examples from out-
side transportation to develop a general theory which will
be used to help explain the puzzles to be observed in the
main focus of the article: a case study of transportation
planning processes in Southern California. Examples will
be given of both the reductionistic use of computer models
by analysts, and the superficial intuition-led use of tech-
nological metaphors by politicians. Both a reliance on
computational procedures and the promotion of a given
technology as panacea provide easy ways out. But not
only does the reductionism exhibited in both cases fail
to make the "big questions" go away, but the abrogation
of responsibility to confront the more basic questions may
lead to decisions to whose consequences we are blind
through the tacit imposition of an ethos which we would
reject were we aware of it.
Patterns of the Mind
We have a paradox: the mind is more than a machine,
but we increasingly deny the power of mind over machine
by behaving in more machine-like ways.
Machines are determinate formal systems; they work
on the basis of concepts programmed into them. A com-
puter deals with information according to a set of rules
encapsulated in its program. These rules form the boun-
daries within which the system operates.
Computers, says Searle (1985) are syntactical symbol
processors: lacking the semantical content of a mind, they
have no way of attaching meaning to symbols. A com-
puter simulation may produce an "optimal" solution which
involves destroying a low-income community, polluting
the atmosphere or damaging areas of natural beauty to
make way for a new freeway. But the computer has no
way to inquire into its own system of inquiry, no way to
judge that system unethical and move to a new way of
looking at the world beyond the assumptions within
which its program must operate.
The mind, in contrast, is directed by intentionality—
"the beliefs, fears, hopes and desires" characteristic of "Free
Will"— which the machine, locked into its program, can
never possess. "If somebody predicts that I am going to
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do something, I might just damn well do something else,"
says Searle. The planner's commitment "to serve the public
interest" (AICP, 1981) may lead him to question whether
it is right to perform certain acts on people, and from such
an awareness challenge the tenets of the system of evalua-
tion which led to such a "solution." Such reflection may
guide him to alter his perspective; he thereby tears himself
from a bounded view to better provide for the clients he
is to serve.
The ability to escape from the constraints of a narrow
system of inquiry, and to do so on the basis of a never-
ending ethical debate, necessarily elevates mind above
machine. Yet, in our yearning for simplicity, we fall easily
into the steady rhythm of mechanical ways.
Consider the following problem: you are given the three
numbers 2, 4, 6, and told they conform to a simple rela-
tional rule. You are to discover the rule by suggesting sets
of three numbers, and being told the numbers conform
or do not conform to the rule. You may try as many sets
of numbers as you wish before announcing what you
think the rule is.
The rule is, simply, "three numbers in increasing order
of magnitude." But if you are like 23 of the 29 subjects
tested in the experiment of Wason (1960) or like the two
of three graduate students tested by this author in the
transportation doctoral seminar at MIT, you will have got
it wrong at first attempt. In nearly all cases, incorrect rules
were sufficient, but not necessary: "increasing intervals
of two," for example. "The point is not that most subjects
failed to give the correct rule at their first announcement,
but that they adopted a strategy which tended to preclude
its attainment." By successively giving sets of numbers
meeting the test of sufficiency, they confirmed their exist-
ing but erroneous beliefs, while success required "a will-
ingness to test those intuitive ideas which so often carry
the feeling of certitude."
Alexander (1965) asserts that designers, "limited as they
must be by the capacity of the mind to form intuitively
accessible structures," do not perform such tests. Quite the
reverse, "the mind's first function is to reduce the ambi-
guity and overlap in a confusing situation" since "it is
endowed with a basic intolerance for ambiguity."
The complexities of modern design problems, he sug-
gests, are like the difficulty of complex arithmetic: they
cannot be completed in one jump. "Complexity defeats
us unless we find a simpler way of writing it down."
Designers, he says, rarely confess their inability to solve
the complex problems which confront them daily. "In-
stead, when a designer does not understand a problem
closely enough to find the order it really calls for, he falls
back on some arbitrarily chosen formal order. The prob-
lem, because of its complexity, remains unsolved" (1964).
Brewer (1973) demonstrates this phenomenon at work
in planning practice in his account of modeling efforts for
the community renewal program of the City of San Fran-
cisco. He shows how "arbitrary weights" were frequently
applied without a theoretical basis for assigning them.
Particularly disturbing was the unfounded use of analo-
gies from chemical kinetics and physics. "The assumptions,
built into the rent pressure relationship," for example, "are
offensive to sense, common or otherwise .... If a model
builder has never been sensitized to the details of a specific
empirical context, one should not find fault with his great
inferential leaps, from decaying isotopes to decaying
houses or from expanding and collapsing magnetic fields
to expanding and collapsing rentals."
It was not simply that a bad job had been done, as one
operations researcher Brewer interviewed pointed out, but
that the city planners wanted to ask detailed questions
which the model could not address. But, says Brewer,
"even though the model can't answer 'those kinds of ques-
tions' it was decided to build in so much detail that those
questions nonetheless appear to be asked." It may thus
be possible to provide the appearance of simple answers
to complex problems; but such action does not make the
problems go away.
Moen (1984), having studied economic growth poten-
tial due to oil shale development in Colorado, similarly
states that while "an ideal population projection method
would provide estimates of the numbers and characteris-
tics of immigrants and outmigrants detailed enough to
plan for community needs," the task is not only "formid-
able" but "impossible, since data on future employment
may be withheld, misrepresented, or even unknown by
industry. Consequently, projections may be highly un-
reliable not only in the long run but from day to day."
Despite the "For Sale" signs "now the local logo" result-
ing from the failure of oil-shale-fired growth in one area,
Moen reports that "the response to the failure of forecast-
ing in Colorado and elsewhere has been the development
of increasingly complicated models that require more and
more assumptions about future events, as well as about
relationships among variables and the stability of these
relationships — all of which may increase the possibility
of error and illusion of precision." Such efforts, says Moen,
are "high-tech quantitative answers to what is essentially
a political and ethical problem."
Mathematical modeling, and especially computer model-
ing, has, however, become commonplace in all social
endeavors of academia, consulting and government, so
much so that according to operations researcher John
Mulvey (1983), "many educated people treat computers
and the ensuing recommendations as objective fact."
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But while the apparent complexity of high-powered
computer tools lends them authority, all quantitative
models, however complicated, must simplify the complex-
ity of the world they represent. To find patterns, "rules"
are needed to decide both what is relevant information
and what is to be rejected, and how the chosen informa-
tion is to be processed. As Wachs (1982) says, "there is
relatively little theory derivable from the social sciences
to help one arrive at reasonable core assumptions." Such
assumptions, which tend to unduly reflect what Godet
(1979) refers to as the "better lit" aspects of reality are
chosen subjectively, not determined objectively, but color
the whole analysis of which they form the fabric.
A mathematical statement has no social content: it is
correctly computed to the extent that it follows the rules
of mathematics. But mathematical statements, though
themselves empty, may powerfully organize information,
and will do so through the assumptions under which they
are set up. Just as Melachthan's eyes filtered information
to form his picture of the universe, so mathematical al-
gorithms form partial pictures of the world which lack
necessary truth. Danger lies when, according to Hoos
(1969), "in the absence of clearly specified limits and con-
ditions, the assumptions and biases of the analyst are
taken as representative of the real system under study."
Learner (1983) finds that a regression of murder rate
on variables thought to influence murder 'leads to the con-
clusion that each additional execution deters thirteen
murders with a standard error of seven. That seems like
such a healthy rate of return that we might want just to
randomly draft executees from the population at large."
But the conclusion changes when the set of variables
thought relevant to the model is altered. A result which
looked convincing under one set of assumptions loses
credibility when those assumptions are changed. "Indi-
viduals with different experiences and different training
will find different subsets of the variables to be candidates
for omission from the equation." So a right winger will
look to the punishment variables and regard others as
doubtful, while "an individual with the bleeding heart prior
sees murder as a result of economic impoverishment."
So the conservative "finds" that execution has a strong
deterrent effect upon murder, while the liberal "finds" that
execution actually encourages further murder.
The death penalty case —"perhaps the single most im-
portant legal use of multiple regression thus far" (Fisher,
1980) - presents a two-fold problem: in the first place the
outcome is most heavily influenced by the prior beliefs
inculcated into the assumptions, rather than by the data
they purport to analyze; but, secondly, and on a deeper
level, not only are the assumptions employed in the pro-
cedure subject to "bias," but the procedure itself reflects
a point of view — the implicit belief that the death penalty
should be used if it will deter murder — which might be
rejected were it to be brought to the surface and subjected
to critical attention.
The use of statistical analysis thus distracts us from
deciding whether society should — as a matter of principle
— have the right to kill someone, a debate which is em-
barrassing because it exposes the roots of our ethical
values, lays them open to criticism, and leaves us uneasy
since there is no unique "sure" solution. It is tempting for
those on both sides of the death penalty debate to stand
behind the illusion of science provided by the apparent
precision of econometric technique. But when opponents
become entangled in technical arguments over the alleged
deterrent effect of capital punishment, their case is weak-
ened because the "right to kill" is tacitly (if unintentional-
ly) presupposed by the calculus employed. (See Kelman,
1982 and Macintyre, 1977 for penetrating discussion of
the assumptions of utilitarianism.)
The El Monte Busway. . .
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Quantitative techniques, then, are not simply subject
to abuse; their use for "honest" purposes may imply a set
of beliefs which their users might reject were they aware
of them. 'The quantitative approach tends to divert our
attention away from the evaluation of the concepts and
variables themselves. . .," says Young (1979). "We can
therefore be drawn into an uncritical acceptance of the
overall framework of theories and approaches to nature
and society."
Passenger Rail in Southern California
Commuter rail thrives in many East Coast cities which
depend on it to bring workers to town in the morning and
send them home in the evening. Traditional urban centers
— concentrated foci of employment activity— sit at the core
of transportation networks branching out to suburbia.
But the low density and widespread distribution of both
population and economic activity in Southern California
generates a complex pattern of transportation demands
between a myriad of origins and destinations. This pat-
tern calls for service more similar to a telephone network
(which connects anywhere to everywhere) than to rigid
linear-based public transportation; this does not augur
well for rail "solutions."
The train is being chosen in California in reaction to
the era of road building and the cult of the car, now seen
as selfish and wasteful. The train, moreover, not only
avoids roads, but carries deep romantic connotations dat-
ing back to an era when we apparently travelled easily
and in grace, and when congestion, pollution and energy
abuse were neither terms in the vernacular nor discom-
forts to the senses.
Adriana Gianturco, Governor Brown's transportation
administrator, was a champion of the rail cause. Under
her aegis, new AMTRAK trains became part-funded by
the State of California and plans were hatched for com-
muter rail operations throughout Southern California.
One of them, connecting Oxnard, sixty-six miles north-
west of Los Angeles, with Union Station near LA's central
business district, started operation.
Oxnard Commuter Rail
Initial ridership forecasts for the proposed Oxnard
commuter rail service were not encouraging and, under
instructions from superiors, Caltrans (California Depart-
ment of Transportation) staff "adjusted" the assumptions
of their model to predict greater numbers of riders. Final
projections of 1,286 daily passengers in each direction
would never materialize: during four months of operation,
ridership peaked at only 175 daily passengers in each
direction and, in February 1983, the new Republican
Deukmeijian administration moved to suspend service.
The obvious interpretation of this story would focus
on the deliberate inflation of projections; but such a
perspective allows more significant ethical issues to escape
attention.
A more critical eye might complain that the computer
model was wrongly employed even before "adjustments"
were requested. The methodology failed to properly ac-
count for problems passengers would face getting between
stations and their homes and places of work, and for the
low frequency and poor timings of the proposed service.
All of these factors would discourage people from using
the train, and would provide a greater disincentive than
the model allowed for. According to this view, more sen-
sitivity should have been shown in setting up the model,
or a better model should have been chosen or developed.
But the problem goes deeper when we appreciate that
the model was not just inappropriate for estimating de-
mand, but wholly inadequate to the task of inquiring into
how transportation might be appropriately provided to
serve society.
Analysis started with the assumption of a given tech-
nology—rail. There was no consideration of alternatives,
nor even an attempt to define the objectives of the service,
which might be more properly stated in terms of alleviat-
ing congestion and pollution, saving energy and providing
mobility to those who might otherwise be denied it.
With demand as implicit surrogate for these objectives,
the degree to which the ultimate goals might be achieved
is obscured. The relations of the equations are allowed
to influence outcome, regardless of whether they imply
a socially justifiable theory. Arriving at such a theory is
the most intractable and difficult problem; but the desire
for a neatly-bounded problem definition makes for avoid-
ance of such issues, and a supposedly value-neutral math-
ematical representation attractive.
We cannot blame the model for failing to ask the deeper
social questions. The model is only part of a system of
inquiry that excludes such debate. But the model diverts
attention from such questions. Just as the death penalty
modelling implicitly assumed that capital punishment
should be used if a certain deterrent effect could be estab-
lished, it is implicit in the Oxnard modelling that rail
service should be provided if a certain "demand" can be
established. The "fact" that we see demand projected
satisfies us that the service can meet "need." We are there-
fore led to exempt ourselves from investigating both what
"need" actually is, and alternative ways it might be
provided.
"Few forecasters engage in blatant falsification in order
to receive a commission or promotion," says Wachs (1982).
"Many, however, are transformed in subtle steps from
analyst to advocate by the situation in which they per-
form their work." In the Oxnard case the modelers did
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respond to pressures for increased projections. We should
be more concerned, however, about what they were doing
before that pressure was applied. "Caught in a net of
language of our own invention," says Alexander (1964),
"we overestimate the language's impartiality." In their
initially "honest" use of a standard approach, the Caltrans
analysts were adopting a language which tacitly framed
the debate, its assumptions unquestioned.
Los Angeles -San Diego Bullet Train
In March 1982, the newly-formed American High
Speed Rail Corporation announced plans to provide high-
speed rail service between Los Angeles and San Diego.
The Corporation produced findings of demand forecasts
by Arthur D. Little consultants which pointed to massive
ridership and a profitable balance sheet.
The point, once more, is not that we need a better
model. The sophisticated computerization was no more
than a facade. If first we ask what transportation is for,
the simplest of techniques enables us to realize that the
bullet train — an import serving the densely concentrated
population centers of Japan — is unsuited to meet the com-
plex intra-regional needs of dispersed Southern California.
But to ask what transportation is for we have to do
more than produce a model. Even if it were possible to
predict exactly how many people would ride, it would
not relieve us of the responsibility to ask why it is that
they should ride on a bullet train rather than take another
means of transportation and to investigate the spillovers,
beneficial or otherwise, that might affect the region and
economy as a whole. To ask these questions properly one
should not start with the bullet train at all, but with the
idea of social need.
Los Angeles' most successful transit project. . .
Without more than the consultant's assurances of profit-
ability, the state legislature almost unanimously approved
a bill to provide up to $1.25 billion in tax-exempt revenue
bonds for high-speed rail. Subsequent examination of the
Arthur D. Little demand projections shows that their
sophistication lies only in their falsehood: the vast major-
ity of the state Legislature had voted to support a project
backed only by an impenetrable labyrinth of computerized
distortion (Richmond, 1983).
The inherent appeal of the plan to the legislators is not
difficult to see. To many Democrats, the plan meant more
public transportation. It meant emptier freeways, a cleaner
environment, and jobs in constructing and operating the
enterprise. To Republicans, the bullet train shone as an
example of capitalism working at its best: profitable
private enterprise providing benefits without cost to the
state. The technology itself was symbolic of those benefits:
no attempt was made to probe beyond the bullet train's
48 Carolina planning
shiny exterior to see if these outcomes would actually
result. In this example we see interaction of the two forms
of reduction under discussion: the power of a computer
model to provide "verification" reinforced the politicians'
untested and erroneous belief in the benefits to be derived
from a symbolically compelling panacea, and stopped
debate.
Light Rail in Los Angeles —A Problem of Politics or Mind?
The problem of politics is the need to form agreement
on an agenda. Politics tends to both limit and fragment
agendas to deal with a myriad of constituencies and the
public at large. But the popular belief that "interests" are
responsible for inadequate agendas ignores the more fun-
damental controlling mechanism: the language in which
politics is conducted.
Voters would be puzzled if they saw on their ballots
propositions asking if they approved of love or belong-
ing, of fairness or equality. "Of course we do," they would
reply, complaining that these were not issues.
Similarly, candidates of all persuasions agree on the
need for "effective transportation systems," but are re-
garded with suspicion if they fail to declare just how they
plan to attain such a lofty goal.
For politicians, like the people they serve, it is difficult
to think and talk in terms of values and goals. They must
instead use lower-order metaphors within the ready grasp
of the mind: they must talk of the "need" for freeways
or trains to do what Churchman (1979) calls "making
polis," to make ground upon which to meet their electorate.
Analysts are drawn to quantitative techniques because of
the clean-cut certainty they appear to provide. Similarly,
"it is undoubtedly simpler" for decision-makers "to deal
solely with concepts for which there are physical referents
than to try to relate abstract concepts such as security or
belonging to the design of transportation systems" (Wachs
and Schofer, 1969). So freeways and trains enter the
political picture with all the connotations of history,
aesthetic and symbolism with which they are associated.
The technologies are only means, enabling us to get some-
where; they are not ends. But they become subjects of
discourse without discussion of the goals that drive them
to be there. There is no consideration of possible alter-
native transportation technologies which might be implied
by such goals (were we to seek them); or of the basic
values upon which these goals ultimately depend. Higher-
order concepts — values and goals — of which we are un-
aware are nonetheless tacitly imputed and carried forward
to return our sins.
For the following example we move from the computer
room to the committee chamber to show that the affinity
for closure on the part of the analyst is paralleled by the
predisposition to technological reductionism on the part
of the decision-maker. We shall see that the politician's
tendency to take technology as given, and as an appro-
priate basis for choice without consideration of the under-
lying values represented by that technology, is similar to
the analyst's desire to present problems as determinate,
quantifiable, and soluble without investigation of the
context in which they are set.
The transcript of the Executive Committee meeting of
the Southern California Association of Governments on
September 1, 1983 (SCAG, 1983a), presents a revealing
illustration of this problem at work. At this meeting, Pro-
fessor Melvin Webber of the University of California,
Berkeley and Professor John Kain of Harvard University
reviewed the agency's Regional Transportation Plan
(SCAG, 1983b), a document which emphasized the de-
velopment of a system of light rail ("trolley") lines to serve
the Los Angeles region.
Webber attributed the failure of San Francisco's Bay
Area Rapid Transit system (BART) to the difficulty of get-
ting to and from stations: it was often faster to drive or
to take the bus. Buses can collect passengers throughout
residential areas, so they can complete the whole trip in
one vehicle. Buses can therefore provide a journey which
is in many cases quicker and more convenient than one
which requires a separate trip to a BART station and a
transfer to the train. Webber emphasized that people con-
sistently chose to travel on the basis of trip time and cost,
and not because of the quality or aesthetics of the ride
itself.
The reason we failed to eliminate traffic con-
gestion is that the cost of accessing a rail sys-
tem is high, and I think that's as true here as
it was in the Bay Area or more so. The reason
it's probably more so is that your land use
pattern is not linear, you don't match a rail-
road's geometry.
Kain said his "overall impression of this is that your
transportation planners are trying to impose a 19th cen-
tury technology on a 20th or 21st century city." He told
the politicians that rail transit worked in high-density
residential corridors where people could either walk to
stations or reach them by short high-frequency feeders.
But in Los Angeles residential development is "far below"
that in areas where rail rapid transit successfully operates,
and the street system is more developed and parking both
more available and less expensive.
Kain stressed the case for express buses, and the need to:
use highways effectively. . .More important-
ly, I can't understand on any rational basis at
least, the fascination with light rail ... I think
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I have some sense of the reason for it; it has
to do with the popularity of Lionel toy elec-
tric trains.
Light rail, he emphasized, is no more than a slow ex-
press bus system with the disadvantage that the route is
fixed, while Los Angeles needs a flexible system.
I don't see any merit to it other than kind of
a romantic, non-rational attraction. It's more
costly; it's slower, has lower line-haul speeds,
has substantially inferior door-to-door capa-
bilities, less capacity. I just cannot think of any
merit to it; it's just incredible that it has the
attraction that it has.
Following this, Councilman Snow asked Professor Kain
if he had "thought about sub-regions for light rail. I live
near a corridor that's highly impacted; the average peak-
hour travel time is eleven miles per hour. I don't know
what the costs of putting in an express busway would be,
but if you add a bus, you slow down overall traffic."
Kain repeated that express buses are a much more flex-
ible technology than light rail, which is "strictly a kind
of combination of a sort of technical irrationality and a
love affair with trains."
Mayor Pro Tern Longville now joined the conversation,
expressing his skepticism over findings that "potential
patrons find the buses to be equally attractive to rail . . .
Just on personal experience and discussions with other
people, I find that very hard to swallow."
Webber repeated that survey results indicated that:
comfort and even safety were relatively low
down the scale, but certainly the decor of the
vehicle had nothing to do with their prefer-
ences. What mattered was overall door-to-
door travel time and overall cost in money.
Kain added:
I've come to these technological proposals with
a very high level of skepticism that largely
arises from my experiences over 20 years all
throughout the world that people just have an
incredible fascination with technology, an in-
credible hope and belief that somehow simple
technologies are going to solve complex prob-
lems. Then, invariably, when you look at
things carefully, it turns out that the techno-
logical solutions are not where it's at, that sort
of nitty-gritty careful hard work in terms of
management using appropriate technologies—
what people think of as ordinary kinds of
technologies — that's where you get your im-
provements. You don't get them out of some
kind of simple technological fix.
But this did not stop Councilman Wagner from saying:
I appreciate your comments regarding cost-
effectiveness, or lack thereof, of a rail-type
system. But I also have the same skepticism
that was expressed earlier about the consumer
acceptance of an extensive bus-type system.
The Councilman cited his readiness to use the rail sys-
tem in England, where he would not be happy to take
a bus.
I don't know if that's a psychological problem
or what, but in terms of a system it doesn't
do any good to have the most cost-effective
and most flexible system in the world if the
ridership simply doesn't materialize.
Webber now mentioned that Golden Gate Transit's im-
proved bus service was "attracting middle-class users in
very large numbers," while Kain explained that bus service
in London suffers from congestion and poor management.
A well-run express system would do much better. Pro-
fessor Webber opined that BART passengers could have
been carried by express bus for one-fortieth of the total
cost. "A large part" of the proposals in the SCAG Regional
Transportation Plan were "just pure waste," offered Pro-
fessor Kain.
Mayor Mikels asked how much capital investment
would be put into rail under a market system, and Mayor
Pro Tern Longville commented that the original "Red Line"
light rail had been dissolved by a conspiracy of bus opera-
tors while "the grossly disproportionate wear and tear on
the roadways caused by heavy vehicles such as buses,
which is nowhere near captured by what they're charged
to operate on those, has to be considered a substantial
subsidy."
Commentary
The discussion between Professors Kain and Webber
and the SCAG politicians was circular. The professors
would present the case as they saw it, the politicians
would make remarks indicating they had not absorbed
the information the academics had presented, and the pro-
fessors would repeat their message once more, increas-
ingly forcefully.
The politicians were focused on the idea of a system
of light rail lines. They felt sure that highways were prob-
lematic, remembered the supposedly successful "Red Cars"
and encapsulated their values of what a transportation
system should do in the symbol of a trolley car.
Repeatedly we see evidence of the politicians' "sense"
experience of technology— the hard end-product of trans-
portation. They had travelled on buses, and could not
believe that buses could provide as effective — or more
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The flexibility of the bus allows passengers to be collected from a large
effective — a service as rail. They saw buses as replicating
existing poor patterns of operation, and could not appre-
ciate that, if designed well, the express bus could be an
effective answer. Irrelevant comments, such as complaints
about wear and tear on roads (ignoring the cost of rail
track maintenance) and "psychological" objections to bus
use (which continued after repeated evidence had been
offered in refutation) simply showed that the politicians
were only looking at the surface of the problem. In the
same way that the narrow technological approach failed
to solve the problem of the village pumps because it
ignored the context in which the problem was set, the
SCAG politicians were ineffective in addressing Southern
Californian transportation problems when they ignored
the context in which those problems were set. In the
same way that subjects failed to try to falsify intuitively-
appealing— but incorrect— solutions to number-series
problems and thereby kept themselves from finding the
answer, the politicians resisted attempts to falsify their
deeply-held beliefs. Light rail to them represented their
ideals; there was no call in their minds for an attempt at
falsification.
To have searched for transportation solutions on the
basis of goals would have required them to drop the image
of light rail as symbolic of higher-level objectives. It would
have required them to reflect on the values they wished
to invoke, and to inquire into the alternative contexts into
which the problem might be set. Not only would an
appreciation of the consequences of each technological
option emerge from such a discussion, but the problem
would come to be defined in non-technological terms.
Technological choice would then be the end-product of
more basic discussion of social issues: it would be part
of a larger conception of design. But to act that way would
require abstract thought, an admission of doubt and un-
certainty. As Professor Kain pointed out, the bus was less
glamorous, and required complex "nitty-gritty" work.
Rail, in contrast, was a neat ordered concept, indeed a
comfortable symbol of those deeper needs and values;
direct exposure to and discussion of those needs would
have made politicians vulnerable to an appreciation of
limits and the unknown.
In refutation of this reading of events, it might be sug-
gested that the politicians are doing no more than playing
politics. If constituents are pleased by the provision of
trolley cars, politicians will have a better chance at re-
election. But when we ask why the politicians might think
constituents would be pleased by such action, we realize
that it is because there is no conception of possible alter-
natives. In Los Angeles, for example, the bus system —
though well-run under the circumstances — is slow and
unappealing. There is no awareness of the possible use
of principles not currently in practice to create a supreme
bus system, and such a conception is available to neither
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politicians nor electorate. There is a dislike of congestion
and pollution which did not exist when the "Red Cars"
reigned. There are fond memories of the "Red Cars," which
seemed to do such a good job, and the weight of those
memories translates into decision-making.
Technologies are solid and identifiable. They provide
something to grapple with where the more basic consid-
erations of values and wants leave us vulnerable and
perplexed. Technology is an effective language of "making
polis." Yet as representative of our deeply-held values and
related goals, it falls short. The failures of social choice
are the failures of the human mind.
The Search for Churchman's Systems Approach
Imagine Kant under the night sky, looking out and
achieving understanding within, two infinities— of endless
reality and fathomless reason — converging in his self.
From the spot where he stands the universe broadens out
"into an unbounded magnitude of worlds beyond worlds
and systems of systems and into the limitless times of their
periodic motion, their beginning and continuance." But
the "moral law," through which the interminable skies are
understood, "begins from my invisible self."
While the world may exist independently of ourselves,
Kant tells us, we can only perceive it— via our vision and
other senses — as interpreted by our reason. As seen
through our mind's eye, the world comes into existence
by passing through the tacit filter of knowledge, experi-
ence and beliefs that go to make up our individual iden-
tities. As each of us is different, so will each of our views
of the world be unique. If we seek understanding, we must
therefore continuously question the way we look at phe-
nomena and the way we bound our universe.
Churchman (1982) calls for "an 'unbounded' systems
approach which must include a study of humanity, not
within a problem area, but universally." Churchman is
firmly a rationalist; he believes in the power of reason.
But his approach does not consist of applying a narrow
set of criteria to a given "problem;" rather, it involves open-
ing up the boundaries of inquiry, guided by ethical prin-
ciples. It regards all systems as part of larger systems, all
parts given relevance only in relation to all other parts
of all other systems. "Those of us who practice social
science learn the hard way that there are no simple ques-
tions and that the process of addressing a specific question
will eventually require answers to more and more ques-
tions." Thus "planners should search not for ways to make
the prison or the hospital run more smoothly, but for the
reasons why we have things like badly-run prisons and
hospitals."
There is no place in Churchman's systems approach for
the isolated modeling of "demand" for a commuter rail
service. Such work, detached from the larger picture, is
representative of a form of analysis with ethical assump-
tions of which we are unaware. We might not wish to
conduct such analysis were those assumptions to be made
explicit. There might be a place for quantitative modeling,
but only when subservient to and informed by debate of
the larger ethical questions which are not susceptible to
quantification; the choice of a system of inquiry is itself
central to such ethical discussion. Likewise, discussion of
the case for a particular technology should only follow
debate of the social goals to be served; the politicians
should broaden their deliberations instead of focusing
quickly on eye-catching and intuitively-attractive "solu-
tions."
But with this systems approach, we quickly run into
difficulties. The Southern California stories immediately
become bound up in a criss-cross of complexity. The
modellers who previously had a "black box" model they
could take off the shelf, are now left perplexed, with no
given place to start. They had a formula; now they face
a void.
To the politicians, the trolley car formed a symbol of
solidity on which to meet and hold political discussions.
It was difficult even to make them evaluate light rail in
comparison to the alternative of an express bus system.
Such choice required reference to abstract notions of inter-
action patterns, demand and performance characteristics.
There was a comfortable, dominant (though faulty) sense
of what the physical technology was, and it was easier
not to go beyond that.
More than this, though, the express bus system and the
trolley each implies a set of values. These were touched
on indirectly through mention of goals such as congestion
and pollution reduction. Yet the conversation never really
got behind the values implicit in the agenda — those of an
elite middle class for whom either system would represent
a greater subsidy per journey than the local buses used
mostly by low-income residents who already pay, and
would continue to pay, a larger share of operating costs
than would the express bus or rail users.
The Long Beach trolley would pass through the low-
income areas of Compton and Watts. But the systems
approach asks why money should be spent on a symbolic
transportation system rather than to provide for the more
pressing needs created by poverty. While one view might
regard the trolley as a messenger of hope for the area,
another might point out that it was of irrelevance in
meeting the real needs of community revitalization.
The discussion could expand to ask what kind of soci-
ety we would like to have, what kind of city we would
like to live in, how transportation related to other pressing
needs, and what priority transportation planning should
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be given relative to those needs. The problem becomes
ever more complex, its solution more uncertain, and our
yearning for a "quick fix" greater: we prefer to reject
complexity.
Conclusion
Reality contains for us untold numbers of what Rittel
and Webber (1973) call "wicked" problems: whereas a cor-
rect solution may be found to a mathematical equation
which is thus "tamed," there is no one solution to a social
problem, no one place to look, no one procedure to
follow, not even a definition of success. If we have such
difficulty in solving a number series problem for which
there is a given solution, how much deeper is our trouble
in facing problems for which there is no one "right"
solution.
Our will for order and identity fool us into treating
"wicked" problems as if they were "tame" ones. We don't
have a "correct" theory of "the good," and even though
we do have a capacity for moral thought — a capacity
machines lack— we opt for more secure machine-like ways
of dealing with information. We pretend we are being
scientific by couching our social science in mathematical
terms, by creating large models we see as "value-free."
Technological choice, by the same token, rests on the in-
tuitive appeal of a technological solution, rather than on
what it can actually do for us.
Were we to look behind our metaphors we might see
that they do not represent our ideals as we assume they
do. Means to ends — be they equations or trolley cars —
all carry assumptions which represent ethical perspectives.
If we have not explicitly chosen these perspectives, we
may not only be unaware of them but also allowing them
to sketch the genetic blueprint of society uncriticized and
perhaps unwanted.
The need for security makes our view small. Yet if we
allow our minds to reject the complexity that is inevitable
of human life, we will have an impoverished, futile plan-
ning process. Until we all — analysts, planners and politi-
cians alike — begin to examine our assumptions and to see
social issues as the "big" unbounded questions they are,
we will produce narrow "answers" to tritely-defined "prob-
lems," and provide no solutions at all.
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